

In the Ruins of the Japanese Empire

Imperial Violence, State Destruction, and the Reordering of Modern East Asia

Edited by Barak Kushner and Andrew Levidis

Hong Kong University Press
The University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
<https://hkupress.hku.hk>

© 2020 Hong Kong University Press

ISBN 978-988-8528-28-8 (*Hardback*)

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by XXXX, Hong Kong, China

Contents

Introduction: The Search for Meaning in Defeat and Victory <i>Barak Kushner</i>	1
Section 1: Collaboration and Dilemmas of Deimperialization	
1. The Politics of Collaboration in Post-liberation Southern Korea <i>Mark E. Caprio</i>	27
2. Punishing Han Traitors beyond Chinese Borders <i>Yun Xia</i>	50
3. Colonial Legacies, War Memories, and Political Violence in Taiwan, 1945–1947 <i>Victor Louzon</i>	76
4. Bullets of a Defeated Nation: The 1946 Shibuya Incident <i>Adam Cathcart</i>	98
Section 2: Negotiating Past and Present in the Military and Political Realms	
5. The Repatriation of Surrendered Japanese Troops, 1945–1947 <i>Rotem Kowner</i>	121
6. Ordered to Disarm, Encouraged to Rearm: Japan's Struggles with the Postwar <i>Garren Mulloy</i>	139
7. Politics in a Fallen Empire: Kishi Nobusuke and the Making of the Conservative Hegemony in Japan <i>Andrew Levidis</i>	161
Section 3: Returning to the Continent, Japan's Relations with New China	
8. Diplomatic Salvation: Buddhist Exchanges and Sino-Japanese Rapprochement <i>Lauren Richardson and Gregory Adam Scott</i>	187

9. Reconstructing Sino-Japanese Friendship: East Asian Literary Camaraderie in Postwar Japan's Sinitic Poetry Scene <i>Matthew Fraleigh</i>	204
List of Contributors	225
Index	229

Bullets of a Defeated Nation: The 1946 Shibuya Incident

Adam Cathcart

Japan's defeat in World War II brought the nation face to face with its former colonies. In the years after 1945, Japanese on the home islands glimpsed at every turn the flotsam of the empire and the stigma of defeat. Japanese migrants flooded into broken ports from settlements in Manchuria and across Asia, bereft of all but the ashes of the dead.¹ While Japanese refugees returned, Asian migrants already lodged in Japan stood as another testimony to the failed colonial experiment. Prime among these individuals on Japanese city streets in 1945 and 1946 were the former subjects of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”—Koreans, Chinese, and, in particular, Taiwanese. In the postwar flux, Asian immigrants in Japan were eager to demonstrate competitive advantage, even national supremacy, over their former colonial masters. In 1945, Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese residents in Japan readily foresaw that the August capitulation would elevate their own status from nationless subjects into respected allies of the American occupation. Asian migrants in Japan associated with “victorious nations,” however, would prove disappointed with the American occupation.

Among the states victorious in World War II, the Republic of China (ROC) was foremost in its eagerness to influence American occupation policy in Japan.² As one facet of that influence, the Chinese government was eager to establish legal dominion over the Chinese and Taiwanese population resident on the Japanese islands. Such dominion would validate China's self-image as a powerful arbiter of international affairs and indicate, symbolically at least, the republic's eradication of the “national humiliation” (國恥 / *guochi*) inflicted by Japan.³ The efforts of

-
1. Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Ren Jun, *Riqiao rimin da zhanlue* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005).
 2. Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations” and Edwin B. Lee and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Commentary,” in *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, Old Dominion University, the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, 21–22 October 1982*, ed. Thomas W. Burkman (Norfolk, VA: Liskey Lithograph, 1984), 29–50.
 3. For more detailed discussion of the ROC's efforts in 1945 and 1946 to wipe away the stains of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, see Adam Cathcart, “Urban Chinese Perspectives on the US Occupation of

Chiang Kai-shek's government to appear strong in relation to Japan also served an internal political function. At a time when the Chinese Communists were pressing to "ardently scrub away the national humiliation," presenting images from Chongqing or Nanjing of a humbled Japan bowing to Chiang's Chinese government had obvious political benefits.⁴

The Shibuya Incident of 1946 was illustrative of China's attempts to influence US policy in postwar Japan, and the ultimate frustration of those attempts. The incident was so named for the district in western Tokyo, an area dominated in the early postwar years by black market activity among Japanese, Koreans, and a few hundred savvy Taiwanese.⁵ When a riot broke out in the black market on July 19, 1946, the local upheaval killed six Taiwanese and one Japanese policeman, injured many others, and set into motion two controversial trials whose effects rippled through the already unstable postwar Sino-Japanese relationship. The arrest and deportation of the Taiwanese concerned, coupled with the exoneration of most of the Japanese in January 1947, stimulated a flurry of activity by the Chinese Mission in Tokyo. The Shibuya Incident also set off a firestorm of comment in the Chinese press, adding strength to China's already potent anti-Japanese discourse. Throughout, the incident and subsequent court cases exposed the growing rift between US and Chinese interests in the occupation of Japan, highlighted issues of nationality in the postwar chaos, and brought into stark relief the limits of Chinese nationalism in Japan itself. Clumsy American attempts to mend fences with a delegation of Chinese journalists after the Shibuya Incident also helped to trigger the "Oppose American Revival of Japan" movement in 1948, the last great student-led campaign of the Chinese civil war era.⁶

Japan, 1945–1947," *Studies on Asia*, Series II, vol. 3, no. 2 (2006): 21–48. On Chinese representation at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, see Xiang Longwan and Marquise Lee Houle, "In Search of Justice for China: The Contributions of Judge Hsiang Che-chun to the Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals at the Tokyo Trial," *Historical Origins of International Criminal Law*, ed. Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, and Yi Ping (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), 143–79.

4. Central Propaganda Department report to the CCP Central Committee, "Propaganda Commemorating the Nine-Year Anniversary of the 'Double Seventh,'" July 7, 1946, *Zhonggang zhongyang wenxian xuanji*, vol. 16, 232–40.
5. Good basic accounts of the incident can be found in Takemae Eije, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002); John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 143–44 and 580–81. Dower's account is based upon "Problems regarding the Treatment of Formosans in Japan Raised by the Shibuya Incident," in *O.S.S./State Department Intelligence Reports, II: Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1977), reel 4, document 6. Neither of the above monographs, however, delves with much detail into the Chinese response to the affair, reflecting a larger absence of Japan from the scholarship on postwar China and vice versa.
6. Not until the spring of 1989 would Beijing and Shanghai again be the site of student protests undertaken without the impetus of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For discussion of the "Oppose American Revival of Japan Movement" of 1948, see Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949*, second edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 42–94; Hong Zhang, *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).

Immigrants and Repatriation in Postwar Japan

How did a brawl between Taiwanese street peddlers and Japanese police in 1946 come to represent a watershed in postwar Sino-Japanese relations? A brief background on the population of migrant Asians in Japan may provide the necessary context. At the end of World War II, more than two million Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese remained in Japan, having arrived as economic migrants or been forcibly relocated to Japan as laborers.⁷ Of these migrants, Koreans made up the largest number, many having served in the Japanese army or as workers in such industries as shipbuilding.⁸ Riven by the postwar “trusteeship” of their divided homeland until 1948, the Koreans in Japan lacked effective state structures.⁹ By contrast, the overseas Chinese population in Japan could at least rely on the diplomatic and political channels afforded by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Nanjing, a government eager (but not always able) to display patrimony over its nominal overseas citizens.¹⁰ (Yun Xia explains more concerning these efforts in Chapter 2 of this volume.) Perhaps animated by a desire to participate in reconstruction on the Mainland, many Chinese in Tokyo sought repatriation. By the end of 1945, about 20,000 Chinese and 3,400 Taiwanese had returned home, most of them with few monetary assets or possessions, but laden with tales of war and occupation.¹¹

That such a large number of Chinese and Taiwanese should have been repatriated in the four months after Japan’s defeat should not indicate, however, that the operation was running smoothly. General Douglas MacArthur’s plans to repatriate most of the Asian immigrants in Japan were overly ambitious, hastily planned, and not easily implemented. When Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) officials offered voluntary repatriation to all Asian migrants in Japan, they found that insufficient numbers departed. In a severely limited transportation environment, frustrated occupation officials were returning Asian nationals to their respective homelands with boats only half full.¹² Meanwhile, Koreans were bodily resisting the notion that the voyage across the Tsushima Strait was permanent.¹³ Further

7. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006): 119–53.

8. For a revisionist view of the Japanese conscription of Koreans, see Brandon Palmer, “Japan’s Mobilization of Korea for War, 1937–1945” (PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, 2006).

9. Sung-hwa Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945–1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

10. The Chinese capital remained in Chongqing until May 5, 1946, when it officially returned to Nanjing. For an old but illuminating example of Chinese regimes protesting mistreatment of Chinese nationals in Japan in the wake of the cataclysmic Kanto earthquake, see Harley Farnsworth MacNair, *China’s New Nationalism* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926).

11. SCAPIN 600, January 15, 1946, cited in Civil Historical Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monographs*, Vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: 1951).

12. *Ibid.*

13. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006): 119–53; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ed., *The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 7–38, 129–54.

complicating the situation, a few thousand intrepid Chinese businessmen were traveling to Japan from cities like Shanghai, sensing a market opportunity in spite of Japan's devastated condition.¹⁴ Immigrants in Japan may not have been wealthy, but for those able to reap limited profits on the black market, Japan and its influx of American soldiers offered an intriguing means of survival.

Perhaps MacArthur sought repatriation as a first option for Asian migrants because of the complex and entangled status of nationality for the Asian migrants who remained in Japan. For Koreans and Taiwanese, SCAP sought administrative simplicity by applying "third-country national" (*daisan-kokujin*) status. The Chinese shared this pejorative distinction with the Koreans and the Taiwanese.¹⁵ Not only was the label galling, it placed the Asian migrants in the enemy category, or on parity with the Japanese.

Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese had expected to have their wartime wounds validated through a public acknowledgment of their superiority to the defeated Japanese. Considering themselves firmly on the winning side, these "third-country nationals" insisted on such privileges as riding on trains for free.¹⁶ American occupation authorities, finding it difficult to differentiate among Asians who had previously been the object of Japanese imperial dominion, did not countenance distinctions between "third-country nationals" and Japanese. Japanese police would continue their patrols. To the affected groups and those in Japan's former colonies, the policy smacked of the racism that had permeated Japanese wartime policy. As occupation officials later assessed, the Taiwanese "had long been under Japanese control, and bitterly resented any semblance of its continuance."¹⁷

For American officials seeking to parse out the nationality of the Taiwanese in Japan, the issue of Taiwan's absorption into China represented another thorny problem.¹⁸ Reflecting the long-standing notion of Taiwanese as Japanese subjects, many Taiwanese residents in Japan possessed no documentation of their Taiwanese origins. News of the corruption and chaos ensuing in the Chinese takeover of Taiwan may also have kept some Taiwanese from more quickly repatriating, as Victor Louzon discusses in Chapter 3 of this volume.¹⁹ In Japan, the unresolved issues of national identity troubled American administrators in their consideration of Japan's Taiwanese population. In early 1946, a series of difficult policy decisions by SCAP

14. In the years from 1946 to 1950, the number of Chinese immigrants to Japan rose from 30,847 to 40,481, an increase due largely to the influx of businessmen from the Mainland, a group comprising forty-three percent of Japan's population of overseas Chinese. See Luo Guanghu, *Riben huaqiaoshi* (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaoci jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994), 337 and 355–56.

15. David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 16, no. 4 (February 26, 1947): 41–45.

16. *Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monographs*, 12.

17. *Ibid.*, 102.

18. The Consul General at Taipei (Krentz) to the Secretary of State, December 17, 1947, *FRUS 1947*, VII: 476–80. See also Draft Message to Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater, Shanghai, China, February 16, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946*, VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 175–76.

19. Steven E. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 59.

created friction both with China and the Taiwanese community in Japanese cities. In spite of attempting to remove the racist connotations that were adhering to the term “Taiwanese,” the occupation appeared indecisive in its determination of the nationality of Taiwanese in Japan.²⁰ In keeping with the times, Americans referred to the Taiwanese as “Formosans.”

Such semantic distinctions were of deep significance to the Chinese Mission in Tokyo, the diplomatic arm of the Nationalist Chinese government, and its head Yorkson Shen (Shen Jinding). Shen was a longtime Japanophile, had published extensively on Japan’s history, and was China’s representative to the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission. Shen and the mission lobbied MacArthur for the Taiwanese to be classified as “United Nations nationals,” an act that would solidify wartime alliances and remove Taiwanese from the “third-country national” status. As American occupation historians noted with alarm, the Chinese government “desired to assert sovereignty over all Formosan nationals irrespective of residence.”²¹ China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty were not honored by the Americans, but Yorkson Shen and his staff in Tokyo continued to issue Chinese passports to even unlikely candidates, including some Koreans.

US occupation officials were less than fully concerned with Chinese pride or a handful of Koreans being granted Chinese nationality; the more pressing worries gathered around the potential for chaos in Japan’s streets. American MPs and Japanese policemen, the first line of defense against mass rebellion or disruption to the occupation, did not wish to be saddled with a whole new category of citizen. MacArthur feared that protests and street activities could get out of hand; the intensity of street protests in April 1946 had confirmed these fears.²² On May 19, 1946, demonstrations for improved food distribution broke out at Japanese prime minister Yoshida’s residence and at the imperial palace, sparking an angry response from MacArthur, who quickly issued a stern “Warning against Mob Disorder or Violence.” The May 20 order stunned Japanese leftists, strengthened the hand of Japanese conservatives, and vividly displayed the limits of the liberalization being pursued under the general’s aegis.²³ MacArthur’s backtracking from liberalization was also noted in China, where Chiang Kai-shek’s May 5 return from interior Chongqing to the national capital of Nanjing had promised a more normalized relationship with a peaceful Japan. If MacArthur was strengthening the very conservatives who had only months earlier pried themselves and their sponsors off the Mainland and their soldiers out of Nanjing, this did not bode well for future

20. Memorandum by the Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, April 2, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VIII, 187–88.

21. *Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monographs*, 22.

22. Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1948), 164–71. For another contemporary account of Koreans protesting, see *Newsweek*, October 22, 1945, 54.

23. For full text of the statement, see *Political Reorientation of Japan*, vol. 2, appendix F, 750. See also Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 49–50.

relations. Amid deepening Chinese skepticism, MacArthur sought to extend his control over the Taiwanese. On May 30, 1946, ten days after his galvanizing statement, MacArthur confirmed his insensitivity to Chinese interests by codifying that “Chinese-Formosans” were legally considered Japanese.²⁴ Among Chinese citizens and the “third-country nationals” in Japan, MacArthur’s action rankled. His decision represented a step backward for American efforts to portray the occupation in a favorable light in Asia.

The Chinese government protested the new policy and undertook a series of unilateral actions to make their displeasure evident. In early July 1946, Nanjing asserted sweeping claims of Chinese nationality over Taiwanese migrants. Only after the news had been blasted through the Chinese press did Nanjing inform the Americans of the decision via diplomatic channels, infuriating MacArthur’s legal section. Mid-July 1946 was thus a sensitive time in negotiations between the US occupation authorities and the Chinese Mission over China’s claims to citizenship for the Taiwanese in Japan.

In the hardscrabble year after Japan’s surrender, however, Chinese arrogance was the least of SCAP’s issues with the Taiwanese, who also formed part of the backbone of Tokyo’s problematic black markets. Black market activity was prevalent, even ubiquitous, in Japanese cities in 1946 and 1947. Tensions stemming from Taiwanese and Japanese in these markets would combine with ongoing legal discussions to play a role in setting up a Sino-US diplomatic confrontation.²⁵

The Shibuya Market

The Shibuya market in 1946 was a far cry from today’s high-tech hubbub and internationalist modernity, but it was still an advantageous location, if only because it had escaped the worst of Allied air raids and was close to an important train station. Within Japan’s upended economic postwar structure, the black markets filled a vital niche in providing Tokyo’s polyglot population with staples like rice and luxuries such as cooking pots. The sellers on the market were a constantly revolving constellation of has-beens and the up-and-coming, all presided over by a Japanese police force still probing the parameters of the new rules under which they were operating.

Among the Japanese sellers on the Shibuya market was Ono Masao, a young man whose background was typical for those in his new profession. In 1943, Ono had been plucked from university and cast into the cauldron of carrier battles in the Pacific. As he flinched his way through a series of losses, witnessing the sinking of the battleship *Yamato*, Ono’s home and assets in Japan were being pulverized by American bombs. After demobilizing and returning home, Ono crossed paths in Tokyo’s rubble with a young war widow and her three children. Wasting little time,

24. *Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monographs*, 22.

25. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 114–19.

Ono married her a few days later. He thereafter set up a home with his new wife and stepchildren, along with his destitute parents. "After Japan's surrender," Ono later noted, he had been "utterly unemployed." In January 1946, his father's health was deteriorating and he was unable to find steady work. Searching for a way out, Ono then hit upon a scheme to lift his family's fortunes. At an evening gathering in Tokyo, natives of Kitakata City, in his home prefecture of Fukushima spoke of weapons buried back home that might be sold for great profit. Convincing Koji Arai, a young friend he had met in a barber shop, to travel with him, Ono left his spot on the Shibuya market, splurged on a train ticket and went to see for himself. On July 7, 1946, the ninth anniversary of full-blown war with China, Ono and Arai began their hunt for buried weapons.

Arriving up north in Kitakata, Ono and Arai trekked through the woods and, finding a few mounds of relatively fresh soil, began digging. They quickly hit upon a large box, seizing a meter-long, heavy-caliber aircraft machine gun. Ono was overjoyed. He sent Arai back to Tokyo with half of the disassembled gun and celebrated by spending one, and then a second, night with a prostitute in his hometown before his return.²⁶ In Tokyo, the machine gun would lie dormant until the day of the Shibuya Incident. Arai may have sought only profits with the gun, but the poisoned environment to which he returned in Tokyo made an early peace dividend unlikely. In the early part of July, Japanese and Taiwanese gangs had been clashing over supremacy of the Tokyo black market.²⁷ Days after Arai returned to the city, on July 17, 1946, one of the merchant's friends, Shigeyama Kotetsu, was killed by a rival Taiwanese seller.²⁸ Shigeyama was not only a Japanese seller of goods, he was affiliated with the Matsuda-gumi, the main black market organization for Japanese, and a friend of Arai, now the possessor of the illegal gun.²⁹ Consequently, on July 17 and 18, 1946, Japanese police began arresting Chinese and Taiwanese vendors in the Shibuya black market.³⁰ In the environment of scarcity, tempers flared. Police were challenging both livelihood and, for the Taiwanese, nationality. Taiwanese gang members proceeded to a Japanese police station to reclaim, forcibly, food that had been confiscated from the black market. To the Americans, such incidents were indicative of a dangerous and growing lawlessness gathering around the Taiwanese. With orders from MacArthur's government, the US authorities charged the Japanese police with cleaning up the black markets in Tokyo.

26. The foregoing account is based upon Ono's statements under oath to Japanese police. See Chief of Public Peace Section, Metropolitan Police Board, re: "Report Regarding Machine-Gun Firing Case," August 8, 1946.

27. On gang activity, and the proclivity of some Taiwanese marketeers to align themselves with political bosses, see Christopher Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, Corruption and Resistance to Reform* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 94-95 and 128.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Chief of Public Peace Section, Metropolitan Police Board, re: "Report Regarding Machine-Gun Firing Case," August 8, 1946.

30. Affidavit by Robert N. Tarumoto, Agent for Tokyo C.I.D., July 20, 1946.

The Incident

On the evening of July 19, 1946, the street market at Shibuya appeared relatively calm, with open stalls in abundance, hawking their wares in a range of dialects. However, behind the scenes were gathering forces that would strike the market and send a tempest through Chinese popular opinion. That evening, a meeting had been called of the Chinese League, a postwar association of Taiwanese merchants. The league's meeting, held at the Showa Primary School, was consumed with crafting an effective response to Japanese arrests of Taiwanese merchants in the prior two days. Reflecting the scope of concerns on the issue, members of the league had traveled to the meeting not just from Yokohama, but as far as Osaka and Kobe.³¹ As the meeting concluded, participants headed downstairs and outside, funneling into three trucks. Lurching forward, they were conveyed to the Chinese Mission in Azabu-ku to unburden their grievances and seek approval for confronting the Japanese police. After a short meeting with unnamed mission staff, the group was augmented to a total size of six trucks, trailed by a taxi and a lone mission jeep. One of the trucks was driven by a sympathetic Japanese, Suzuki Takeichi.³² They proceeded to the Japanese police station at Shibuya.³³ The Taiwanese professed peaceful intentions, but the implements that weighed in their hands indicated that the men were prepared for violence. Among their weapons were an assortment of knives, clubs, pistols, a bamboo spear, and at least one Molotov cocktail.³⁴ While the Taiwanese were anticipating a clash, another group of Japanese lay in wait for the coming confrontation.

At a nearby school, about two hundred Japanese affiliated with the Matsudagumi gang were entrenched, awaiting the impending showdown.³⁵ Here, Ono and Awai's machine gun was deployed by the Japanese black market sellers in defense of their territory. Having heard that the Taiwanese were drawing near, Awai hauled the weapon and some three hundred rounds of aircraft ammunition behind a nearby train station, where he hastily assembled the machine gun.³⁶ Awai hurried to the school, ran up to the roof, and handed off the weapon to an excited eighteen-year-old, Urase Shoji. Perhaps fearing that time had rendered the gun useless, Shoji squeezed the trigger, unleashing a long burst of bullets. Local police were immediately alerted and descended upon the school, immediately arresting Shoji,

31. Herbert L. Berman and John L. Murphey (Defense Lawyers for Formosans) to Judge Advocate and Commanding General, Eighth Army, January 7, 1947, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal Section, Law Division Decimal File 1945-1951, box 1419, Folder 9 "Shibuya Incident."

32. Ibid.

33. *Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monographs*, 22.

34. Chief of Liaison Section, Military Police Board, Tokyo Metropolis, to Provost Marshall Office, July 19, 1946, re: "Report on the Illegal Shooting of Formosan Group."

35. E. Shupak, Investigator, to Chief of Public Safety Section, re "Report of Incident of July 19 at Japanese School Near Finance Building.

36. Chief of Public Peace Section, Metropolitan Police Board, "Report Regarding Machine-Gun Firing Case," August 21, 1946.

handcuffing Awai, and initiating a manhunt for Ono Masao.³⁷ The police, tipped off, had dampened a potential conflagration.

The Taiwanese group, meanwhile, was nearing the Shibuya Police Station, where a phalanx of Japanese policemen stood waiting. Two of the trucks passed the station, but it appears that a Taiwanese on the last truck in the convoy squeezed the trigger of his weapon, firing on the Japanese and beginning a gun battle in the streets of Shibuya ward.³⁸ Blocking the trucks from escaping, nearly four hundred Japanese police waded into the crowd, brawling with Taiwanese.³⁹ Later court reports showed that about half of the police were armed; about ninety of them fired their weapons in the course of the battle.⁴⁰ Six Taiwanese were killed, as was Sergeant Haga of the police force, all gunshot fatalities. Forty Taiwanese were arrested, but according to Japanese police records about 140 escaped. The magnitude of the upheaval was such that American military police in the city of Tokyo were mobilized for combat; their “alert” status was rescinded only the following morning.⁴¹

The Trial

From the Chinese perspective, the story of the trial following the incident encapsulates nearly all of the themes of Japan’s history under US occupation: the grudging allowance of Allied participation, selective prosecution of Japanese, and the primacy of Japan’s rehabilitation over the political needs of the Chinese allies. All of these contributed thus to serious Chinese discontent over the American policy. However, the incident also brings to light China’s semi-aggressive diplomatic stance toward Japan. Because the Taiwanese suspects could be considered as citizens of the Republic of China, the Chinese Mission vigorously interjected itself into virtually every arena of the trial of the thirty-five Taiwanese merchants and the three Japanese policemen.

37. Uruse Shoji ultimately received two years of hard labor as a result. After pleading stoically with American judges, Ono and Arai each got three years of hard labor. Shupak to Public Safety Section, “Further Investigation of Machine-Gun Firing Incident,” August 22, 1946; Metropolitan Police Board, “Report on the Sentences Passed Upon Suspects Involved on the Case of the Machine-Gun Discharge,” August 22, 1946.

38. George T. Hagen (Legal Section Chief of Staff) to Alva C. Carpenter (Chief, Legal Section), re: “Shibuya Incident of 19 July 1946,” January 21, 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal Section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

39. Eighth Army HQ, Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger to SCAP, re: “Sentence of Military Commission against Formosan Defendants in Case of Cheng Shang Tang et. al. (Shibuya Incident),” February 16, 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

40. George T. Hagen (Legal Section Chief of Staff) to Alva C. Carpenter (Chief, Legal Section), re: “Shibuya Incident of 19 July 1946,” January 21, 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal Section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

41. Captain William A. Griffith, Operations Journal, Headquarters of 720th Military Police Battalion, S-3 Section, “Alert for 19 July 1946.”

Chinese suspicions of excessive latitude offered by the Americans to the Japanese police appeared to be validated in the immediate aftermath of the arrests. For the first week of confinement, Taiwanese were held in Japanese jails, individually interrogated by Japanese policemen in their cells without counsel. Problems with interpreters were also encountered as three defendants did not speak a word of Japanese.⁴² The effectiveness of the Japanese methods, however, was revealed when the one Taiwanese who had remained in Japanese custody produced a written confession.⁴³ After one week of being held and questioned at Japanese police headquarters, the Taiwanese were transferred into Allied custody. Though they had the Taiwanese in US custody, the Americans did their best to placate Japanese concerns. During the trials, American legal officers diligently guarded the authority of Japanese police to arrest Taiwanese criminals who were not, as they wrote, “ipso facto Chinese nationals.” The Japanese police, in the words of American prosecutors, need never “question their authority to apprehend Formosan-Chinese in the future.”⁴⁴ To the extent that the Japanese could vigorously prosecute crimes committed by Taiwanese, the American military court sought to give them the requisite latitude.

The Shibuya trial formally began on September 30, 1946, attracting intense scrutiny from the Chinese press. The Chinese government succeeded in appointing one Chinese judge, Henry Chiu (Qiu Shaoheng), to the three-man panel of judges. In a later US propaganda release intended for Chinese audiences, this concession to Nanjing’s demands was depicted as indicative of American sensitivity to Chinese interests, boasting that “special American defense attorneys [were] provided for the Formosans in addition to the attorneys provided by the Chinese mission.”⁴⁵

However, such cosmetic images could not quell the storm and stress provoked by the Shibuya case. Mirroring the angst caused by the case on the Mainland, letters sent to Douglas MacArthur by overseas Chinese in Japan were both vehement and voluminous. Chen Li-Kwei, representing the General Chinese Association in Japan, wrote of the reaction of his constituents, describing them as “regretful and disturbed” over the trial proceedings.⁴⁶ Chen’s language partly mirrored the obser-

42. Herbert L. Berman and John L. Murphey (Defense Lawyers for Formosans) to Judge Advocate and Commanding General, Eighth Army, January 7, 1947, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

43. Herbert L. Berman and John L. Murphey (Defense Lawyers for Formosans) to Judge Advocate and Commanding General, Eighth Army, January 7, 1947, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

44. Legal Section to Chief Provost Marshal, re: “Arrest by Japanese Police of Formosan-Chinese, Tseng Jenhsiung,” October 25, 1946, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal Section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 “Shibuya Incident.”

45. GHQ, SCAP Legal Section, Public Relations Informational Summary No. 388, re: “Result of the Trial of 41 Formosans,” December 10, 1946.

46. Chen Li-Kwei [Representative of General Chinese Association in Japan], to General Douglas MacArthur, December 22, 1946, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor

quious tone of other requests to the general, but added a demanding twist, asking “for your Excellency, who is a lover of justice and principle” to mete out “severe punishment on the Japanese assailants.” The Taiwanese, according to Chen, were “victims who were slandered by the plotters,” juxtaposing Chinese “victims” with “Japanese assailants” in a direct appropriation of Resistance War-era rhetoric.

While he could ignore letters (or have them opened well before they reached his desk), MacArthur could less easily sidestep inquiries issuing from Chinese diplomats in Japan concerning the Shibuya case. On December 5, 1946, Yorkson Shen, as acting chief of the Chinese Mission, slipped through the imposing doors of SCAP’s headquarters in search of General MacArthur. Shen was diverted into the offices of State Department Diplomatic Section Chief George Atcheson, Jr., where the Chinese diplomat voiced his complaints about the Shibuya case to Atcheson and Max W. Bishop. (Atcheson would die in a plane crash eight months later, and Bishop would return to the State Department’s Division of North Asian Affairs as an influential conservative proponent of the “reverse course.”)⁴⁷ Shen, citing the need for SCAP to grant “political considerations” to the trial, requested the Americans delay the verdict on the Taiwanese, advocating that the Japanese police should first be tried and sentenced. Such a sequencing of events, Shen argued, would mollify Chinese public opinion, which was becoming agitated over the case. The Shibuya Incident, in other words, was becoming a political problem for the Chinese, and, by extension, the US government. In Shen’s view, the United States may have been supporting Chiang Kai-shek in his anti-Communist thrust toward Harbin, but the Americans also needed to be mindful of saving Chiang’s face with regard to Japan. Shen quickly went on to assert that the Shibuya trial was being subverted by the prejudicial and racist ideologies of the prosecution and the American members of the bench. The testimony of the Japanese police was another point of contention, and the evocation of Japan’s inherent racism became a key facet of Chinese arguments about the Shibuya case in both the press and in diplomatic contexts.

Atcheson, having borne out Shen’s fusillade with the studied patience of an experienced diplomat, responded with a dissertation on the American judicial process. “Under our system,” Atcheson said, the Japanese policemen were being “vigorously cross-examined.” Bishop subsequently chimed in, claiming that “our principles of judicial impartiality [have] precluded any pressure from the executive to steer the outcome.” As if to state the impossibility of any intrusion into the trial by his office, Bishop asserted that “there existed no proper means by which the executive authorities could interfere with the judicial proceedings.” During the Shibuya case, US occupation officials therefore claimed that they were incapable of interfering with judicial process simply to meet political goals. This stance directly opposed

for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 7; 1946:701 Folder 10 701.1 China (Shibuya Incident).

47. See Eiji Takamae, *GHQ*, 151. For a firsthand anecdote regarding Atcheson’s final flight, see William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (London: The Cresset Press, 1965), 58.

that which the United States had adopted during the Tokyo Trials, during which, despite pressure to indict Emperor Hirohito for war crimes, the United States had protected the Japanese emperor in the interests of buttressing political stability in Japan. Political stability in China, by contrast, was seen by American officials in Japan as an abstraction; fallout from the Shibuya case, they assumed, would quickly pass through the Chinese press.

Responding to Shen's concerns about agitated press coverage of the Shibuya case, the Americans noted that the maintenance of order, not mollification of Chinese public opinion, was their highest duty in Tokyo. Acheson voiced his utter skepticism of Chinese press criticisms of the Shibuya case specifically and the occupation generally. Of the assertion "that we [the United States] were inclined to support Japan as against China," Acheson said, "this seem[ed] to me fantastic, especially in the light of American friendship for China and the help which the United States had been giving and was continuing to give to China." At this point Shen nodded his assent, clearly aware of the threat of withdrawal of US support implicit in Acheson's remarks. In December 1946, in the fresh afterglow of the Sino-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, neither he nor the Americans could acknowledge the legitimacy of anti-American currents in China. As he left, Shen made one final plea that the Americans delay the sentencing of the Taiwanese until after the Japanese had been tried and sentenced. He was refused.⁴⁸

The verdict of the Allied Military Commission arrived on December 10, 1946: "One Formosan was sentenced to three years hard labor, thirty-five to two years hard labor, and two were acquitted. All prison sentences were made subject to suspension upon deportation of the culprits by first available transportation."⁴⁹ The trial resulted in hard labor for three Taiwanese and the deportation of thirty-five more. Some of the convicted Taiwanese "chose deportation as an alternative to imprisonment."⁵⁰

Acheson may have rebuffed Shen's request, but in the aftermath of the December 10 verdict, he spent more than a few hours engaged in damage control. On January 2, 1947, George Acheson dictated a letter in response to one of Chen Li-kwei's fiery epistles to MacArthur. It was a delicate task, given the discomfort among the Chinese in Japan to whom the letter was addressed. Acheson, without using the provocative term "third-country national," asked Chen to recall that "the

48. Memorandum of Conversation between Yorkson C. T. Shen, George Acheson, and Max W. Bishop regarding Chinese Government Representation re Shibuya Incident of 15 July 1946," December 5, 1946, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo. Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949. Folder 701.1, China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) (January-June 1947) [Box 17, Folder 12].

49. United States Information Service, Shanghai, January 29, 1947.

50. George Acheson, Jr., to Secretary of State, "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946; Transmission of Record of Trial in the Case of the United States vs. Chang Sheng, et. al." (copy also sent to American Embassy in Nanking), Tokyo, March 10, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) - (January-June 1947).

natives of Formosa involved were not at the time documented as Chinese citizens.” Atcheson went on to cite the prior appointment of the Chinese judge Henry Chiu to the bench of the military commission, an action, he noted, “undertaken as a gesture of our traditional friendship for China and pursuant to General MacArthur’s desire to give all possible assistance and consideration to Chinese interests in Japan.” Atcheson’s verbatim repetition of MacArthur’s words was a standard defense of the occupation years, but the Chinese quickly tired of it. Atcheson, assuming a sternly pedagogical tone, depicted to Chen the actions of the Taiwanese as “an armed gang” bent on employing “dangerous weapons pistols, iron bars and wood clubs in acts of violence.” The guilty Taiwanese, Atcheson said, were “a menace to peace and order and therefore to the security of the Occupation forces & they committed acts which caused loss of life and personal injury and which were prejudicial to the peace and order of the Occupation.” He closed his note brusquely, reminding Chen that three of the Japanese police would shortly be tried for their offenses.⁵¹

Though Yorkson Shen had earlier advocated an early trial for the Japanese, he now suddenly pushed for its delay. On January 6, Shen telephoned Bishop, noting his displeasure that the Americans had in fact begun the trial on December 27, 1946, without forewarning the Chinese. The best the Chinese could hope for at this point, Bishop responded, was to send a temporary representative to report to the judicial office of the Eighth Army at Yokohama.⁵² Two days later, the Chinese Mission admitted its failure and authorized Dr. Y. Koung, freshly arrived in Tokyo, as the government’s official observer at the trial of the Japanese. Koung arrived at court, sweeping up all the documents he could find, including trial transcripts, and forwarded them to Nanjing. While diligent, Koung was limited by his lack of fluency in English.⁵³ The mission, dissatisfied, continued to press for representation on the military commission trying the Japanese suspects.⁵⁴ This was a military

51. George Atcheson, Jr., to Chen Li-kwei, Tokyo, January 2, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 – China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) (January–June 1947).

52. Memorandum of Conversation between Yorkson C. T. Shen and Max W. Bishop regarding Trial of Japanese Police Involved in Shibuya Incident,” January 6, 1947, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Folder 701.1 China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) – (January–June 1947) [Box 17, Folder 12].

53. Tsang Yuan, of the University of Dayton, suggested to me at a conference in Wittenberg University in 2006 that the KMT failure to find a single qualified English speaker for the task might have been an intentional sop to the Japanese right-wing.

54. In response, the Diplomatic Section of GHQ denied the request, dismissing it as “impracticable to appoint a Chinese assistant prosecutor.” As for Berman, he was “under orders to return to the United States” and had no desire to become involved in any further controversies in Japan. However, the prosecutors in the trial of the Japanese, John L. Murphey and Paul F. Faison, had recently served as advisers to the Taiwanese. After realizing that no Chinese would be appointed to the bench or to the prosecution team, the Chinese Mission requested that American lawyer Herbert Berman fill the open position of assistant prosecutor, as Berman had previously “acted as Chief Advisory Counsel for some of the Formosans tried in connection with the incident.” Berman, as was noted in marginalia on SCAP documents, had shown his tendency to protect Chinese over Japanese interests in that capacity. Chinese Mission in Japan, Tokyo, to Diplomatic Section, GHQ, January 8, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 – China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) – (January–June

court, barring Chinese participation. The Chinese could not get what they wanted most: the satisfaction of watching a Chinese magistrate pronouncing sentence on ostensibly guilty Japanese defendants.

William Sebald, MacArthur's legal adviser, thereafter bore the brunt of Yorkson Shen's frustration.⁵⁵ Shen stressed the political importance of the trial, reflecting the viewpoint of China's major daily papers. He asserted that the trial of the Japanese policemen appeared lax in comparison to the prosecution of the Taiwanese. The Japanese, he argued, should be punished severely. Moreover, Shen "consider[ed] it strange that the defendant policemen should for all practical purposes be at liberty to proceed as though they were not accused individuals." Sebald sought to diffuse the situation by inviting Shen and the mission's legal staff out to GHQ to informally talk about the Shibuya case.⁵⁶ No record of this subsequent conversation is found in American archives, perhaps because the verdict intervened.

After the verdict was announced on January 20, the Chinese Mission made a final protest, insisting upon the guilt of the Japanese policemen. The mission objected that excessive attention had been devoted to black market activities by Taiwanese, disputing the testimony of Japanese policemen and noting that these police were "accomplices of their superiors in their joint act of firing upon civilians." Most significant, the Taiwanese were depicted as defenseless victims of Japanese aggression. "Crowded together in a few trucks," the mission wrote, the Taiwanese were "outnumbered and practically surrounded by the police who were armed and prepared for action." Shen recalled that the police had admitted to firing 242 shots into the crowd. The mission concluded with its strongest point: "Testimony given by the police witnesses would indicate that deep-seated ill feeling against the Formosans existed in the Japanese police force." In other words, Japanese racism, the stain of the colonial period, explained completely the readiness of Japanese police to fire upon Taiwanese merchants. This feeling, too, was the fulcrum of anger in the Chinese press. Based upon this racism, Shen wrote, the police had been "mentally bent upon making an example of the Formosans." Appealing to wartime sensibilities, the mission urged the Americans to retry the Japanese police and find them "guilty of cold-blooded murders."⁵⁷

1947). The request for a seat on the military commission was similarly declined, since "existing directives proved only for regular Occupation courts to try non-United Nations nationals." Diplomatic Section, GHQ, to Chinese Mission in Japan, Tokyo, January 10, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) - (January-June 1947).

55. Sebald's memoir does not mention this conversation, nor indeed Yorkson Shen, but contains a fair number of references to the Chinese Mission staff, especially Chu Shiming. See William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (London: The Cresset Press, 1965), 128-29.

56. "Memorandum of Conversation between Yorkson C. T. Shen and William Sebald regarding Shibuya Incident," January 11, 1947, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo. Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949. Folder 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) - (January-June 1947) [i.e., Box 17, Folder 12].

57. Chinese Mission in Tokyo to US Political Advisor for Japan, "On the Shibuya Incident," January 20, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General

In spite of the ardor with which they were conveyed, all of the Chinese Mission's points were rejected by the reviewing authority. Alva Carpenter, the chief of the Legal Section, indirectly expressed his pique at the presumptuous behavior of the Chinese: "If any legal grounds exist for the request made by the Chinese Mission, this Section is unable to perceive them."⁵⁸

Having received a series of stinging legal rejections, the Chinese Mission would not be mollified by American compliments that it, the mission, had "struggled valiantly" to protect Chinese interests in Japan. One SCAP legal staff member, after this backhanded compliment, noted that the Japanese police were not just blameless with regard to racism, but had displayed "a moderation that would not be found in large American cities."⁵⁹ The patronizing tone of US statements to the Japanese increasingly crept into the US-China dynamic in Japan itself, bending against China's explicit desires for parity with both the United States and supremacy over defeated Japan. In the Shibuya case, the Chinese government had sought US consideration for the KMT's domestic political problems, but had been rebuffed, leading Chinese observers to speculate about excessive Japanese influence.⁶⁰ These suspicions of US-Japan collusion were not simply the provenance of Yorkson Shen, his sympathetic staff at the Chinese Mission in Tokyo, and the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing, but were amplified through the mainland news media in the Republic of China.

Media Response

The Shibuya Incident triggered a public outcry whose excessive emotion indicated that China's wounds from the War of Resistance had hardly begun to heal. One Chinese Catholic newspaper angrily described the incident as "a provocation to China and a disgrace to China."⁶¹ For Chinese audiences, the death of a "third-country national" in Tokyo highlighted Japan's perceived unrepentant attitude toward

Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 – China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) (January–June 1947).

58. Alva C. Carpenter, Legal Section to Diplomatic Section, December 6, 1946, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 "Shibuya Incident."

59. The document's original phrase had been "most American cities," but was changed to "large American cities," perhaps to play down the presence of racism among white police officers in US urban areas in 1946. George T. Hagen (Legal Section Chief of Staff) to Alva C. Carpenter (Chief, Legal Section), re: "Shibuya Incident of 19 July 1946," January 21, 1947, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal section, Law Division Decimal File 1945–1951, box 1419, Folder 9 "Shibuya Incident."

60. "Memorandum of Conversation between Yorkson C. T. Shen, George Atcheson, and Max W. Bishop regarding Chinese Government Representation re Shibuya Incident of 15 July 1946," December 5, 1946, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State; Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Folder 701.1 – China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) – (January–June 1947) [Box 17, Folder 12].

61. *Yi Hih Pao*, Nanking, quoted in Stuart [Ambassador to Nanking] to Secretary of State, August 2, 1946, National Archives RG 59, 893.00/8-246.

China. Moreover, the murdered man's Taiwanese origins reminded those on the Mainland of Japan's long occupation of that island, spanning back to the humiliating 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. More painfully, the incident exposed China's inability to influence the character of the occupation. Journalists ardently challenged the validity of American rule in Japan and demanded that China be granted a more substantial role in determining occupation policy. One newspaper in Tianjin went so far as to call for a "dominant Chinese role in controlling Japan."⁶² Chiang Kai-shek, whose earlier pledges to occupy Japan with Chinese arms had rung hollow, was far too engrossed in war against the CCP to take concrete steps to control Japan.

The response to the incident was perhaps most vehement in Taiwan. In a statement translated and remarked upon with some alarm by American officials in Tokyo, Taiwanese students called the Shibuya Incident "another national catastrophe after years of resistance." In the eyes of the students, the incident "betrayed the perennial aggressive attitude of the Japanese and their age-old contempt for the Chinese people."⁶³ On the mainland, subsequent slights were thereafter interpreted nearly invariably as Japanese intent to revive itself as an insult to China. When a Japanese freighter pulled into Shanghai's Huangpu River in November 1946, for example, the ship's Rising Sun flag (or *Hinomaru*) inspired similar coverage emphasizing Chinese "disgrace" on account of the incident.⁶⁴ On December 16, 1946, the *Wenhuibao* of Shanghai wrote of the Shibuya Incident: "It was a case of the bullets of a defeated nation killing and wounding the citizens of a victorious nation." The article castigated the American judge and his "Japanese agents."⁶⁵ The incident revealed the need for the formerly colonized population to frame their past as one of collective—and continued—resistance. In Chinese materials, the Shibuya Incident was perceived as a corollary to Japanese aggression in China. To the Chinese press, it seemed that Japanese police were axiomatically aggressive killers who sought to humiliate China. Had Ono Masao's machine gun actually been used against the Taiwanese, the Chinese press certainly would have emphasized the fact that Ono was a veteran, embodying the symbolic revival of Japanese militarism.

62. *China Weekly Review*, October 5, 1946, 140; *China Weekly Review*, October 12, 1946, 163. For a good overview of wartime Allied plans for Chinese troops to occupy the major island of Shikoku, a portion of lower Honshu, and part of the internationalized city of Tokyo, see Xiaoyuan Liu, *Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

63. "A Statement to the Taiwanese Regarding the Shibuya Incident," January 1947, translated and enclosed in Charles Willoughby [G-2] Memorandum, January 27, 1947, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Folder 701.1 – China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) – (January–June 1947) [Box 17, Folder 12]. More than contempt, the verdict appeared to confirm China's powerlessness. *China Weekly Review*, February 1, 1947, 256.

64. *China Weekly Review*, October 12, 1946, 298.

65. Wen Hui Pao, Shanghai, December 16, 1946, translated in American Consulate at Shanghai Chinese Press Review to George Atcheson, US Political Advisor for Japan, December 16, 1946, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 7; 1946:701, Folder 10, 701.1 China (Shibuya Incident). See also Paul Pickowicz, "Victory as Defeat: Postwar Visualizations of China's War of Resistance," in *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond*, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 365–98.

The Shibuya Incident coincided with the expansion of the Chinese civil war, a troubling display of internecine violence that only intensified Chinese apprehensions toward Japan. The outrage over alleged Japanese misbehavior toward Taiwanese in Tokyo may also have been tempered by memories of the Japanese occupation of Chinese cities and intensified by the ongoing presence of Japanese military personnel in China after 1946.⁶⁶ It also intersected with the KMT's brutal occupation of Taiwan, throwing new light onto Taiwan-KMT relations and the need for both parties to paint an idealized image of mutual wartime resistance.⁶⁷

Indignant criticisms of the Shibuya verdicts were issuing from the mainland press, the Nanjing government, and the Chinese mission in Tokyo, yet the Japanese press remained muted about Chinese agitation on account of the case. Why? American censors had been shielding Japanese audiences from criticism of the occupation, preferring praise as a means of educating the people in the new systems. The impact of American censorship on the development of postwar Sino-Japanese relations is clearly illustrated in the US response to Shibuya trial. When a Japanese correspondent for the *Nippon Times* interviewed Yorkson Shen in January 1947, the acting Chinese member of the Allied Council laid waste to the idea of American justice in Japan. Mincing few words in his critique of the trial's outcome, Shen stated: "My personal impression is that both trials were unfair. The Chinese Government has considered this case seriously and we have had observers at both trials. The Chinese judge at the first trial dissented. I consider the whole case unfair."⁶⁸ When the Japanese correspondent filed the story, however, all references to Shen and the views of the Chinese Mission were censored by the American authorities, preventing any mention in Japan of the powerful backlash the Shibuya verdict was creating in China. US mediation of the Sino-Japanese relationship, as seen in the press coverage of the Shibuya case, resulted in stymied Chinese spokesmen and an oblivious Japanese public.

The American Consulate in Shanghai, always on the pulse of Chinese press opinion, became acutely aware of Chinese outrage over the Shibuya verdict. In late December 1946, the consulate requested that John Caldwell, the acting director of the United States Information Service (USIS) in China, prepare summaries of negative press comment in China regarding the Shibuya Incident.⁶⁹ The USIS, formerly

66. Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949," *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (May 1983): 497-518; Daqing Yang, "Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar China, 1945-49," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (München: iudicium verlag, 1998), 185-206.

67. Steven E. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

68. Charles Willoughby [G-2] Memorandum, January 27, 1947 (includes *Nippon Times* article with censored text), RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Folder 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) (January-June 1947) [Box 17, Folder 12].

69. American Consulate at Shanghai to George Atcheson, US Political Advisor for Japan, December 28, 1946, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 7; 1946:701 Folder 10 701.1 China (Shibuya Incident).

the Office of War Information, had sustained serious cuts after World War II; its operations in China had been under criticism from such individuals as General George Marshall since early 1946. However, timing, not funding, in December 1946 and January 1947 made matters difficult for the USIS in China, as the office was reeling in response to another scandal. American marines had raped a Beijing University student, Shen Chong, on Christmas Eve 1946, leading to massive student protests that would rock the foundations of the US-China relationship. The destructive actions of two drunken American soldiers not only invited a spectacular wave of opprobrium, they also prevented the United States from directly addressing Chinese skepticism toward US-controlled Japan.

Seeking to give USIS outlets fodder in January 1947, MacArthur's office issued to the Chinese press a long justification for the Shibuya verdict. This propaganda, while hastily drafted, nevertheless faithfully reflected MacArthur's traditional concern with law and order. SCAP public relations officers relied upon transparently planted quotations from unnamed "American civilians" present at the trial of the Taiwanese, who reportedly stated, "if I ever had to be tried, I hope that I would be shown as much fair play as these defendants have received."⁷⁰ Clumsy and drowned out in the anti-American chorus over Shen Chong, the article was an ineffective instrument of transformation for the Chinese views of the US occupation of Japan.

The sustained anger in China concerned George Atcheson in Tokyo; on January 29, 1947, he penned a long memorandum to the secretary of state. Atcheson noted that the Chinese Mission had, throughout the duration of the trial, doubted the testimony of the Japanese police. He enclosed excerpts from the *Wenhuibao* December 16 editorial, which, he warned the secretary, "clearly indicates an anti-American bias and is believed to be typical of the manner in which the 'Shibuya Incident' has been treated by the Chinese press." Atcheson concluded by cautioning that his talks with the Chinese Mission had "largely been fruitless in view of the generally unreasonable attitude taken by the Chinese."⁷¹

Secretary Atcheson could hardly have expected the recently arrived US ambassador to China, Leighton L. Stuart, to staunch the Chinese response. Stuart, long "busy with an accumulation of detail" at his ravaged postwar Yenching University, had arrived in Nanjing only the previous July and concentrated thereafter almost

70. GHQ, SCAP Legal Section, Public Relations Informational Summary No. 388, re: "Result of the Trial of 41 Formosans," December 10, 1946, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII), SCAP, Legal Section, Law Division Decimal File 1945-1951, box 1419, Folder 9 "Shibuya Incident." "SCAP Issues Statement on Shibuya Incident," United States Information Service, Shanghai Branch, Daily News Bulletin, January 29, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) - (January-June 1947).

71. George Atcheson, Jr., to Secretary of State, "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946" Tokyo, January 23, 1947, National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan - Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 17, Folder 12, File 701.1 - China (Courts, Trials, Arrests) (January-June 1947).

exclusively on mediation efforts in the Chinese civil war.⁷² Stuart's thoughts on the Shibuya case were never fully expressed, as he expended more energy on tempering the harm of the Shen Chong rape case, which had erupted from within his old base, the Beijing universities, in the turn from 1946 to 1947. The convergence of the Shen Chong and Shibuya stories and their inherent similarities in dealing with an American justice system in an occupied country augured serious problems for American public diplomacy in China.

Coda

The thirty-five Shibuya convicts boarded the *Tachibana Maru* at Sasebo, leaving Japan on April 16, 1947, for the voyage to Taiwan. Under the watchful eye of American troops, the convicts were grouped together on the ship with an additional five Japanese war criminals and fifteen former Chinese "puppet" officials being shipped to Taiwan. Given the political sensitivities of the ship's human cargo, the Chinese government in Nanjing authorized five Chinese military police to accompany the convicts, but, although these MPs had been able to carry arms in the Chinese Mission in Tokyo, the Americans demanded that they turn over their pistols before boarding the *Tachibana Maru*.⁷³ As a microcosm of the geometry between their various entities, the US-Japan-China-Taiwan relationship and the intersection between past and present within those relations, few metaphors are as rich as this voyage.

The Chinese government could claim few symbolic victories in the termination of the Shibuya case, but the question of nationality was finally settled in their favor in February 1947, when the Taiwanese in Japan were accorded Chinese nationality. The Koreans, lacking national representation in Tokyo, were not granted national status.⁷⁴ However, from the Chinese perspective, the Americans had followed the Japanese lead for too long in dealing with the migrant populations within Japan, and had not moved swiftly enough to satisfy the Taiwanese in their desires. The strife surrounding the Shibuya Incident aggravated Chinese pride, resulted in widely aired skepticism toward US justice, and galvanized Chinese anti-Americanism at a critical moment in the emerging Cold War.

The response to the Shibuya case thus provides an example of a Chinese government willing to defend its overseas interests in spite of American patronage in the 1940s. The Chinese actions undertaken in connection to the Shibuya case were

72. John Leighton Stuart, *Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador* (New York: Random House, 1954), 163–66.

73. See National Archives RG 84, Office of the US Political Advisor for Japan – Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 17, Folder 701.1 – China (General) (January–June). In particular, within the folder, see Chinese Mission in Japan, Tokyo, Consular Affairs Office, "Letter to Diplomatic Section of GHQ," April 10, 1947; George Atcheson to American Consulate in Shanghai, March 26, 1947, "Arrangements to Send Chinese Puppets to Formosa;" Provost Marshal to Diplomatic Section, SCAP, March 17, 1947.

74. *Non-Military Activities of Occupation of Japan*, 22.

hardly those of a “running dog,” and reflected the burgeoning confidence of Chiang Kai-shek’s government after its return to Nanjing and its favorable position on the battlefield in mid-1946. The KMT government’s obstinacy on the issues associated with the Shibuya case equaled and presaged the hard, Sinocentric outlook of the CCP in power. Chiang Kai-shek’s National Government supported the claims of Formosans in Japan to Chinese citizenship, but went far beyond that. In examining the many impacts that the incident and its prolonged publicity had in China, it becomes clear that the KMT itself planted the seeds, at least in part, of the “Oppose American Revival of Japan” movement, keeping occupied Japan as a front-page issue in Chinese newspapers.

The Shibuya Incident and its aftermath illustrate strong Sino-Japanese postwar ties, but also suggest that US unilateralism in Japan short-circuited the reconciliation process between Japan and its neighbors. Chinese suspicions of an unrepentant Japanese revival and the indispensable role of anti-Japanese nationalism in the Chinese press remain relevant, but so, too, do questions of Japan’s unequal treatment of minorities. Finally, viewed as history, the response to the Shibuya Incident reveals the vigorous aspirations of postwar China to reclaim its central position and foremost stature in East Asia.

MacArthur’s belated and indignant response pointed to a larger problem for the United States: the Americans were wholly unprepared to explain the occupation to Japan’s neighbors.⁷⁵ This failing reflected larger problems with US propaganda efforts in postwar Asia. With missionary zeal, American authorities had needed only a week in Tokyo to disband the Japanese Dōmei news agency and its many Chinese-language media outlets on the Mainland.⁷⁶ Although substantial continuities existed between the old and new regimes in Japan, beaming international news into China was not one. Within China itself, the American propaganda infrastructure had been badly degraded by the rush home in the startling wake of Japan’s surrender. It was, as US president Harry Truman later complained, a case where “mamma and papa and every Congressman wanted every boy discharged at once after Japan folded up.”⁷⁷ This homeward impulse extended to information operations; after Japan’s surrender, USIS officers in Chongqing simply cleaned off their desks and left.⁷⁸ Thereafter, America’s policies of retribution and benevolence in

75. For the self-critiques of occupation officials on this specific issue, see Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 109–10; Robert B. Textor, *Failure in Japan: With Keystones for a Successful Policy* (New York: J. Day Co., 1951), 21, 33–45, and 61–67. Textor spent seventeen months in Kyoto as an assistant civil information and education officer for I Corps at Kyoto and, on a two-year and two-month deployment overall, spoke Japanese.

76. “MAGIC” Diplomatic Summary, September 15, 1945. For greater detail on Dōmei operations, see “The Japanese Domestic Radio Audience – Report No. 16 from Bureau of Overseas Intelligence, Foreign Morale Analysis Division (OWI), March 15, 1945, Box 110, Records of the Office of War Information,” cited in Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), 145. Mao Zedong had called Dōmei programming “lies,” but even he respected the power of Japanese broadcasting.

77. Harry Truman, “Draft Speech (Undelivered),” April 17, 1948, in *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1980), 132.

78. Tillman Durdin, “Chungking Losing Its Wartime Aura,” *New York Times*, October 26, 1945.

Japan would have to be self-evident.⁷⁹ This precipitous reduction in propaganda activities on the Mainland brought lasting negative consequences for the United States in Asia. Chinese audiences, bystanders to the occupation, had little sense of how zealously MacArthur's military regime pushed pacifism or the destruction of Japan's armaments.⁸⁰ Neither MacArthur nor the US State Department had anticipated the need to justify their occupation policies or to convey their transformative effects to anyone other than the American people.⁸¹ Intermittent attempts at persuasion by the United States and lingering bitterness toward Japan in Chinese cities mingled together, creating a combustible atmosphere in which future incidents would unfold.

Realizing that mere press statements would not placate Chinese public skepticism of his administration in Japan, MacArthur hit upon a solution to his public relations dilemma: he would bring a group of Chinese editors to Japan. Were they able to see for themselves the justice of the occupation regime and witness the fundamental transformations undergone by the Japanese people since 1945, MacArthur reasoned, the editors could aid in mollifying Chinese public opinion toward occupied Japan. The visit of Chinese newspaper editors was set up hastily in February 1947 and took place at the end of that month, but the results were far from the glowing reports that MacArthur had envisioned. The Chinese editors, led by *Dagongbao* chief Wang Yunsheng, took MacArthur to task for stopping short in his transformation of Japan and, in the process, endangering China. These dozen journalists returned to the Mainland with alarming stories of Japan's revival, stories that were reissued in booklet form by Shanghai publishing houses. The intense interest in China regarding developments in Japan, piqued by the Shibuya Incident, was fed by the subsequent visit of the editors and exploded with the "Oppose American Revival of Japan" movement in 1948. The American attempt at damage control in the aftermath of the Shibuya Incident had backfired.

79. Wilma Fairbank, *America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949*, Department of State Publication 8839, International Information and Cultural Series 108 (Washington, DC: June 1976). See also William Benton [Assistant Secretary of State], "The Role of International Information Service in Conduct of Foreign Relations," *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 21, 1945 (Washington, DC) Vol. XIII, No. 330, 589-95; Anonymous, "Our International Information Policy," *The Department of State Bulletin* Dec. 16, 1945 (Washington, DC) Vol. XIII, No. 338, 947-53.

80. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*.

81. For a good general bibliography of USIS activities, see Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).